Abstract-Mobile botnets have proliferated with the popularization of mobile and portable devices, being a simple and powerful method to launch Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. This letter presents a stochastic adaptive model for mobile botnets' dynamics and their self-organized and self-adaptive behavior to generate DDoS attacks. The bots' collaborations combine reinforcement and fading rules based upon the level of servers' activity and map to a time-varying weighted directed graph. This model can explain the natural emergence of two distinct time-scales when bots massively attack a server.
I. INTRODUCTION
M OBILE botnets are a simple and powerful method to launch DDoS attacks [1] that can strongly damage companies' reputations and increase their operating costs [2] . Its large-scale nature and readily adaptive behavior quickly render conventional cybersecurity techniques obsolete. A DDoS attack causes a massive amount of requests to a target server, halting its processing of legitimate requests from users. Identifying imminent targets of botnets is crucial to guarantee resilience and reliability of the service provided by the network infrastructure.
Our goal in this letter is to identify vulnerable targets to a DDoS attack. To this end, we introduce a stochastic adaptive model to represent mobile botnets and their self-organized behavior leading to DDoS attacks. We assume that bots coordinate among themselves via peer-to-peer command and control protocols and do not have a prior target, i.e., there is no leader among bots. We start from a basic principle: when a server reaches a busy state, it tends to delay its response to requests. Accordingly, whenever a bot contacts a server and the server does not respond, the bot will tend to contact the server in the future. Our model explores how bots update their policy of attack based on this principle and through exchanging their local policy with peers.
We confirm, via numerical simulations on our model, results that have been observed empirically in the literature that the overcrowding process happens naturally at two different time scales. First, a slowbot time scale, where bots synchronize towards increasing their attacks to a few servers by increasing their level of activity to a busy state; and a second fastbot time-scale where communication among bots significantly speeds up the process of attacks to a server that goes from a busy state to an overcrowded state. This two-time scale behavior arises naturally; surprisingly, the rules of policy updating are the same during the whole crowding process -bots do not change the rules at any time.
As a result, servers that reach a busy state are imminent targets to become massively attacked (or overcrowded) by the botnet in a short period of time. Moreover, we show that the interval of time associated with the second phase -from busy to overcrowded -can be estimated through a mean-field Susceptible-Infected (SI) epidemics logistic dynamics approximation [3] . Most existing studies have investigated botnets through empirical approaches, e.g., [4] , [5] , considering different measurement methods. Some model-based studies are focused mainly on attack detection or malware spreading, e.g., [6] , [7] , contributing basically to threat analysis. However, it has been recognized that there is a need for models that can explain and evaluate the limits for coordination dynamics among mobile bots and can contribute to the design of effective countermeasures [5] , [8] , [9] . Ref. [10] , for instance, studies the impact of malware propagation (by constructing a percolation type model that builds upon the movement of mobile bots) on the load of servers under a DDoS attack. Such approaches -impact of malware propagation on the attack -still lacks directly accounting for the communication, and thus coordination, among bots during an attack. Our present work emphasizes the latter (rather than the former) and provides a simple model and theoretical analysis to develop and understand botnet dynamic coordinated behavior in launching DDoS attacks.
Our model shows the nonlinear time scale involved in overcrowding a server under a flat-hierarchical framework -i.e., with no bot-masters in the botnet. We distinguish between busy and overcrowded servers. Our main conclusion is that as soon as a server becomes busy it swiftly turns overcrowded when exposed to a flat-hierarchical botnet. Another characteristic of our work is that we assume communication among bots, which, as will be observed, significantly impacts the dynamics of attacks.
A. Outline of the Letter
Section II introduces the model for botnet dynamics through DDoS attacks. Section III shows the two different time-scales involved in the process of overcrowding a server and illustrates that the SI epidemics dynamics can approximate the fastbot phase behavior. It also compares the slowbot phase with a case where bots do not communicate among themselves. Section IV concludes the letter.
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II. PROBLEM FORMULATION In this section, we introduce an adaptive stochastic timevarying network model to describe botnet dynamics for DDoS attacks. We assume that bots have no prior information regarding which server to attack, but that bots slowly crowd onto a target server through directly estimating the servers' activity and via peer-to-peer communication. We reserve the term busy for a server that reaches its capacity of response, i.e., the number of requests it receives from bots is of the order of the server's capacity; and overcrowded for when the number of requests received by a server is much larger than its capacity of response.
As a server reaches criticality (busy state), its ability to respond to requests is naturally diminished. This can be used by the bots to determine if the server's response is being compromised and the attack is being successful. In fact, a bot can make a request to a server and monitor the response latency. Even though the response may be delayed for many reasons not tied to the server's ability to respond, the response delay to the bot request is a good indicator, up to first order, of the amount of traffic to the server. This letter studies how a mobile botnet -malware hosted in mobile devices -can explore this information through attacks. Our model captures two important elements of the mobile botnet DDoS attack:
• Limited resources: each bot can only perform few requests in a time window;
• Limited capacity of response of servers. We assume that the requests made by each bot are sparse in time and that they have no prior knowledge on which server to attack. This means that bots must communicate among themselves to coordinate the attack and possibly converge on which server to overload. In our model, we assume that the state evolves at each time t as follows: i) each bot probes directly one server to estimate its response latency (refer to Subsection II-A); ii) bots exchange their local estimates of the response latency. Based on this shared information, bots may amend their policy of attack (refer to Subsection II-B). Next, we introduce our model in detail.
For the sake of simplicity, we abstract the physical network (servers+bots) by a graph on N nodes, where each node i has a capacity Q i of responding to requests and each node makes one request at each time t to other nodes. We assume a weighted directed graph, where the weights p i j (t) i j stand for the (conditional) likelihood of requests between nodes, in particular, p i j (t) gives the likelihood of i making a request to j at time t. Under this framework, each node has very limited ability to perform requests (as mobile devices or bots) and they have limited capacity to respond to receiving requests (as servers). This model is equivalent to considering explicitly two classes of nodes, namely, servers and bots connected together. From now on, we may refer to a server or a bot simply as a node indistinguishably.
In the following subsections we explain in detail each of these steps underlying the networked dynamics of the bots.
A. Estimating Response Latency 1) Requests:
At each time step t, each node i makes a request to one and only one node. If i requests j (which happens with probability p i j (t)) and j does not respond -because it is busy, and this is the only reason we assume for not responding -then, the edge weight p i j (t) from i to j is reinforced, i.e., p i j (t + 1) > p i j (t). In other words, i is more likely to make further requests to j in the next time step. We choose the following rule for reinforcement p i j (t + 1) = p i j (t ) +1 2 and note that
2) Response: If node j receives more requests than its capacity, then j does not respond to any of the requests. Otherwise, it responds to all requests. In other words, each node makes the most of its capacity for response.
We normalize the dynamics to take place in the probability simplex of stochastic matrices, i.e., the set of matrices p ∈ [0, 1] N×N whose rows sum to one, N j =1 p i j = 1. This guarantees, in particular, persistency of attacks, i.e., at each time t a node makes a request with probability 1. The proposed networked dynamical model is given as follows
Reinforce or Fade
(1)
where d i is the out-degree of node i ; C i j (t) is the indicator of a request from i to j at time t, i.e., C i j (t) = 1 if i makes a request to j and C i j (t) = 0, otherwise; R j i (t) is the indicator of response from j to i , and p i j (t) ∈ [0, 1] is the normalized state that can be interpreted informally as the likelihood of i making a request to j , at time t, and formally as the conditional distribution of C i j (t), p i j (t) = P C i j (t) = 1 |F t , where F t is the sigma-algebra generated by the matrix stochastic process (p(t)) := p i j (t) i j up to time t. The fact that (p(t)) lies in the simplex of probability matrices guarantees (or is consistent with) persistency of attacks, i.e., each node makes a request with probability 1 for every t. One can show that the set of stochastic matrices is invariant under the dynamics in (1)-(2). Moreover, one can prove that (p(t)) converges, as time goes to infinity almost surely to a binary matrix (or graph) -due to limited space, this proof lies out of the scope of this letter, but it goes along the lines of the convergence proof in [11] . Therefore, one can analyze the long term overcrowding of servers simply by checking the in-flow degree of the limit graph. Overcrowded nodes are those with high in-flow degree in the long run, i.e., in the limit graph.
B. Protocol to Exchange of Information
We refer to the term probability policy of attack at time t of a node i as the i th row p i (t) of the matrix p(t), i.e., the vector stacking the likelihoods of i posing requests to other nodes. If the probability mass of a policy is mostly concentrated in a particular (outward) edge, then we refer to this policy as an assertive policy. We say that node i has a more assertive policy than j whenever max k p ik (t) > max k p j k (t), i.e., the policy of i concentrates more probability mass in one edge than the policy of j . We refer to nodes with very assertive policies as leaders -in that, other nodes will copy their policies through the protocol of communication and, thus, tend to follow the target of the leader.
The protocol of communication among nodes to exchange their local probability policies runs as follows: at time step t, each node i selects (uniformly) randomly two of its neighbors, say j and , to query about its current probability policy for requests. If either of them, j or , has a more assertive probability policy than i , that is, max m= j, max k p mk (t) > max k p ik (t) then, node i assumes the policy of the most assertive node, say m = j , i.e., p i (t+1) := p j (t), where p (t) is the th row of p(t).
1) Remark:
The qualitative behavior of the simulations in Section III illustrates the sparse support network of communication among bots due to their narrow band resources. We choose two neighbors which whom to exchange information just as a particular instance of the small capacity of interbot communication.
C. Hitting Times
As mentioned, we distinguish between a busy server and an overcrowded server. For instance, when a server is busy, simple measures may alleviate the pressure on it, e.g., by adjoining few further resources, but when it is overcrowded, that is not the case. We define two hitting times accordingly:
where Q i is the capacity of node i (as a server) to respond to requests, and α is a configurable parameter close to 1. As we illustrate in the next section, T b tends to be much smaller than T c , in other words, the time scale to overcrowd one server is nonlinear: it takes a longer time to bring a server to a busy state, and once the server is busy it swiftly turns overcrowded. That is, it is crucial to take measures to reduce the stress on servers before they become busy.
III. NUMERICAL SIMULATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we present numerical results that illustrate the emergence of the two time scales to overcrowd a server given by slowbot and fastbot phases (refer to Subsection III-A). We discuss the results in Subsection III-B. In the slowbot period, bots naturally agree on a target server by trial-and-error and exchange of policies of attack, and in the fastbot stage, communication among bots prevails to escalate their attention towards a busy server within a much shorter interval of time. This conforms to a metastable behavior, where the system bots+servers spend a long time in a seemingly steady state with no busy servers, and as soon as a server turns busy, it swiftly becomes overcrowded. We also present Fig. 1 . Evolution of the number of requests over time on the only server that was eventually overcrowded. The two figures illustrate the two time-scales associated with busying a server followed by overcrowding it.
simulations to illustrate how the slowbot hitting time scales with the capacity of servers.
A. Numerical Simulation
We assume 200 nodes with capacity of response 8 each. The simulations were obtained within a time window of 5000 iterates, i.e., t = 0, 1, . . . , 5000. We performed 10 simulations, and all of them exhibited convergence, that is, a server, and only one server at all 10 experiments, was observed to be overcrowded within the time window of 5000 iterates. We assume α = 0.95. servers latency and do not exchange policies of attack -and we observed that only in 4 times a server was overcrowded within the time window of 6000 iterates. In other words, the exchange of policies play a determining role in strictly reducing the slowbot hitting time T b , and more quantitative properties associated with this will be explored in future work.
In Fig. 2 , we illustrate three experiments, each with different capacity for the servers involved in the attack, e.g., the blue curve illustrates the evolution of the number of requests on the server eventually overcrowded assuming capacity Q = 7. The experiment illustrates that servers' capacity plays an important role in the slowbot time and a quantitative analysis on how such hitting time scales with the capacity of servers (which is often a controllable parameter) will be pursued in the future.
B. Discussion
Once a server hits the busy state, bots connecting to the busy server tend to reinforce their connections, in other words, their policy of attack will tend to become more and more assertive towards the busy server as time goes by. These nodes will have dominant assertive policies in the network, i.e., their policies will be copied by other nodes that contact them. Such assertive policies targeting the busy server will spread in an SI-like dynamics as described by the meanfield model
where Y (t) models the number of nodes with the referred assertive policy pointing to a target busy server. Fig. 3 depicts the evolution of the SI logistic dynamical system (3), with N = 200 and initial condition Y (0) = 8, and the qualitative behavior of the SI dynamics matches with the evolution of our system in the time window [T b , T c ]. Thus, we observe that under a simple protocol to exchange local policies of attack and without previous knowledge on a target server by the bots (i.e., without a bot-leader), in a first phase, bots can adapt and steer their attacks towards a server that enters the busy state, followed by a fast overcrowding of the corresponding busy server(s) in a second phase. In other words, servers that reach their capacity are the main target to be overcrowded by the botnet. 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This letter proposes a time-varying stochastic network model to identify vulnerable targets in DDoS attacks. We showed the emergence of a natural nonlinear time-scale in overcrowding a server: i) (slowbot) a first leaderless phase where bots are coordinating to overuse a (unkown) server without any bot possessing an assertive policy; ii) (fastbot) where at least one server reaches its capacity -hence, delaying responses -and few leader bots whose dominant assertive policies are to be naturally spread in a Susceptible Infected like dynamics. Estimating finer analytical qualitative properties of the (distributions of the) hitting times and quantitative analysis of the impact of communication and server capacity in the slowbot phase are left as future work.
